Automated cloud forensics
Daily cloud compromise assessments for UK telecoms.
Every day, Strand reviews your cloud tenants at forensic depth to determine if they've been compromised, and where the next threat may come from. If it finds something, Strand runs the full investigation: root cause, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and reporting.
- Microsoft 365
- Microsoft Entra ID
- Microsoft Azure
- AWS
- Google Workspace
How often is your cloud estate actually examined? · Illustrative, rolling 12 months
- Assessments recorded
- 1
- Time between reviews
- 12 months
- Latest evidence review
- Sep 2025
- Used by digital forensics firms on live casework
- No changes made to your environment
- UK-hosted customer data
- Review security controls
Why telecoms
The accounts that control your network live in the cloud.
UK telecoms security rules changed. The Telecommunications Security Code of Practice, the government guidance that sits under the Telecommunications (Security) Act, was revised for 2026. It treats the systems that oversee your network as critical assets: authentication, monitoring, virtualisation, and orchestration. Almost all of them are administered through cloud accounts.
Those accounts are what Strand examines: the administrators, service accounts, supplier applications, and cross-cloud roles that can reach your network. It shows you whose access is too broad, what changed, and whether your logs show anyone misusing that access.
Assume compromise
Plan on the basis that your critical systems may already be compromised without your knowledge.
Code of Practice 2026 · para 1.11
Threat hunt
Hunt for threats in your logs on a regular cycle, in-house or through an independent third party.
Code of Practice 2026 · M16.02 and M16.03
Find root cause
Investigate incidents to root cause and act to stop them happening again.
Code of Practice 2026 · M5.05
Strand reads the logs behind those accounts every day, including activity that never raised an alert. In one published investigation, a digital forensics firm used Strand to find the root cause of an Akira ransomware attack and map the full attack chain in 30 minutes. Read the investigation.
Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2026
The Code of Practice expects regular threat hunting. Strand does it daily and keeps the record.
Ofcom assesses providers against the Code of Practice. The 2026 revision expects regular threat hunting in your logs and root-cause analysis after incidents. An independent third party can do the hunting. Strand performs that work across your connected cloud estate and records what was reviewed, what was found, and what was fixed.
Public telecoms providers shall ensure that threat hunting is periodically performed using available logging and monitoring data.Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2026, v1.1, M16.02
| Code expectation | How Strand supports the security team |
|---|---|
| Periodic threat hunting using available logging and monitoring data (M16.02) | A daily hunt through your cloud sign-in, application, storage, and administrative logs for signs of attacker activity |
| Threat hunting may be performed by an independent third party (M16.03) | Strand acts as that independent hunting capability and keeps a dated record of each hunt: what was reviewed, what was found, any gaps, and the follow-up |
| Identify incident root cause and take steps to prevent recurrence (M5.05) | A full investigation that documents cause, scope, impact, and remediation |
| Prompt or real-time monitoring and retention of relevant source data (Regulation 6) | Strand works alongside your monitoring. It does not replace your monitoring or your log retention |
The daily assessment
What could an attacker use? Has anyone already got in?
Every assessment answers both. The posture assessment finds the weaknesses: broad admin rights, missing MFA, risky application permissions, exposed storage. The compromise assessment goes through your logs for evidence that anyone has actually used them.
- operator-uk
- m365
- entra
- azure
- aws
- workspace
- run 2026-08-21 · 14:00 to 14:47 UTC
- Assessment 12 of 28
1 · Posture assessment
No change since yesterday's assessment · 0 regressed · 0 resolved
- Passed
- Failed
- N/A
Priority posture findings
- HIGH
Unused administrator roles still hold permanent access across two cloud accounts
- HIGH
Public object storage is accessible outside an approved exception
- MED
3 privileged accounts with no MFA registered
- MED
High-risk OAuth grant held by an unverified supplier application
- LOW
Long-lived access key has no recorded rotation date
Posture by control domain
- Privileged access100
- Identity & authentication78.9
- Applications & workload access62.5
- Data sharing & storage47.6
- Audit log coverage0
2 · Compromise assessment · past 30 days
- No evidenceNo suspicious privileged sign-ins identified across the connected identity providers
- No evidenceNo unexplained changes to mailboxes, automation identities, or access keys that would keep an attacker's access open
- ReviewOne high-privilege application-consent event requires confirmation from the application owner; no related misuse was identified
Evidence sources
12
sign-in, audit, application, storage, and admin logs
Review window
30 days
historical activity examined across connected clouds
Coverage gaps
3
each gap is listed in the result
Assessment cadence
Daily
timestamped posture and compromise record
Illustrative output. Every conclusion states the scope, the period reviewed, and any gaps in coverage.
The first assessment records a baseline of your estate and reviews your historical activity. Every assessment after that reports what changed and what happened since yesterday.
Remediation
Finds what you need to fix, and tells you how to fix it.
Each finding identifies the setting, account, or application affected, states the risk, and gives the change that fixes it. Your team decides what to change and when.
- operator-uk
- Remediation plan
- run 2026-08-21
- Assessment 12 of 28
Immediate review
High-risk exposure- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on the three privileged identities with no strong method recorded.
- Remove the supplier application's organisation-wide permissions and grant back only the ones it needs.
- Rotate the inactive AWS access key still attached to a privileged automation account.
Scheduled remediation
Control weakness- Require named reviewers and short expiry for application-consent requests.
- Remove broad cross-account role trust and limit the supplier role to the production resources it administers.
- Close anonymous sharing links and public object-storage access that have no approved business owner.
- Restrict temporary access and recovery methods to controlled onboarding workflows.
- Bring the Azure subscription with missing activity logs into the assessment scope.
Planned hardening
Attack surface- Limit guest invitations and external sharing to approved teams and domains.
- Remove unused service principals, workload identities, and Google Workspace service accounts.
- Set maximum lifetimes for application secrets and rotate long-lived credentials.
- Document owners for privileged integrations and cross-cloud trust relationships.
Illustrative output from a daily assessment.
The next assessment verifies each fix and flags anything that regresses.
Daily assessment scope
The evidence Strand reviews across your cloud estate.
Strand covers Microsoft 365, Entra ID, Azure, AWS, and Google Workspace. Every result states what was reviewed, the period it covers, and anything that could not be collected.
Identity and authentication
Privileged roles, MFA, authentication policy, access keys, and external identities across Microsoft Entra ID, AWS IAM, and Google Workspace.
Applications and delegated access
Microsoft enterprise applications and OAuth grants, Azure service principals, AWS role trust, and Google Workspace domain-wide delegation.
Mail, collaboration, and storage
Forwarding, mailbox rules, guest access, anonymous links, public storage, and external sharing across Microsoft 365, Azure Storage, Amazon S3, and Google Workspace.
Cloud infrastructure posture
Privileged configuration, logging, network exposure, encryption, and access controls across Azure subscriptions and AWS accounts.
Activity and compromise signals
Microsoft audit events, Azure Activity Log, AWS CloudTrail, and Google Workspace audit data reviewed for suspicious authentication, privilege change, persistence, and data access.
Full incident investigation
If compromise is found, the same case continues across cloud, identity, endpoint, and server evidence to establish cause, scope, and impact.
From assessment to investigation
If something is found, Strand runs the full investigation.
Investigation is what Strand was built for. Digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) firms use it to run their investigations. When a daily assessment turns up real evidence, the same case continues: how the attacker got in, what they changed, where they moved, what data they reached, and whether it left. Containment steps and the executive, technical, and evidence reports come from the same platform. No waiting for an outside forensics team to start.
| Scope | M365 · Entra · Azure · AWS · Workspace |
|---|---|
| Reviewed period | 2026-07-23 to 2026-08-21 |
| Evidence reviewed | 12 cloud evidence sources |
| Items triaged | 6 |
| Result | No indicators identified in the reviewed sources |
| Limitations | 3 coverage gaps recorded |
| First evidence | 2026-08-02 · 03:41 UTC |
|---|---|
| Root cause | Unrotated secret in a supplier application |
| Persistence | New application credential identified |
| Lateral movement | 2 identities · 1 affected workload |
| Data access / exfiltration | SharePoint site and S3 bucket accessed · available logs show no bulk or external transfer |
| Response and reports | Sessions revoked · secrets rotated · application disabled · executive, technical, and evidence reports |
Alongside your SOC
Your SOC handles incidents and alerts. Strand examines the evidence.
Monitoring is built to spot known patterns and raise alerts. An attacker who signs in with valid stolen credentials and behaves like an administrator often triggers nothing. Strand does not wait for alerts. Every day it reads the logs themselves: sign-ins, permission changes, mailbox rules, application grants, storage access. Your SOC keeps its role. Strand hands it one conclusion a day with the evidence attached, not another queue of alerts.
| Endpoint protection (EDR / XDR) | Watches laptops and servers and blocks known-bad behaviour. |
| Security monitoring (SIEM / MDR / SOC) | Triages alerts and responds to incidents around the clock. |
| Strand daily assessment | Examines the cloud evidence itself, every day, and reports on posture and compromise. |
| Strand full investigation | Runs the investigation end to end: root cause, scope, impact, containment, and the final report. |
28-day proof of concept
Run daily forensic assessments across your cloud estate for 28 days.
Connect Microsoft 365, Entra ID, Azure, AWS, and Google Workspace. Strand assesses each platform daily for 28 days and makes no changes to your environment. You finish with a prioritised fix list and a clear answer to whether you have been compromised. If something is found, the same case continues into a full investigation.
Sources: Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2026 (version 1.1), paragraphs 1.11 and 1.13, measures M5.05, M16.02 and M16.03 · Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022, Regulation 6 · Product scope and security controls: Strand Trust Center.